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CONVERSION OF NONEXEMPT PROPERTY
TO EXEMPT PROPERTY ON THE EVE
OF BANKRUPTCY IN ARKANSAS*
J. Thomas Hardin**
Difficult economic times have forced more and more people to
consider bankruptcy as the ultimate solution to their financial
problems.' Faced with the unknowns of bankruptcy, these people
have many fears. Foremost is a concern about what property they
will be able to keep. The Bankruptcy Code and Arkansas' exemption
laws answer this question for Arkansas debtors. The question and its
answer, however, may lead the debtor and his lawyer into risky wa-
ters which endanger the effectiveness of the debtor's bankruptcy and
raise important ethical considerations for the attorney.
In part, the risk is created by the tension between the two pri-
mary purposes of bankruptcy laws: (1) to give the debtor a fresh start
by relieving him of debt;2 and (2) to make an equitable and efficient
distribution of the debtor's property among his creditors.3 Arkansas'
* For a related article dealing with Oklahoma law, see Hardin, Bankruptcy Planning:
Risks of Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 12
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 279 (1987).
** B.S., Purdue University; J.D., University of Arkansas; Director of Hartzog Conger &
Cason, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
1. This article only considers the conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets in
the context of a bankruptcy. The exemption statutes, however, also apply to nonbankruptcy
proceedings, such as garnishments or executions of judgments outside of the bankruptcy
context.
2. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). In Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) the Supreme Court citing Williams stated:
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being
of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.
See Williams v. Swann, 220 Ark. 906, 251 S.W.2d 111 (1952) (exemptions were enacted for the
benefit of distressed debtors).
3. See Bisignano, Protecting Assets From Overzealous Creditors or An Estate Planner's
Guide to Preservation Planning, Financial and Estate Planning (CCH) 25,951, at 24,021-
24,052 (Dec. 1987); Hicks, Protecting a Professional Client's Assets From the Potential Claims
of Creditors, 13 EsT. PLAN. (1986); Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The
Use of Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property On the Eve of Bankruptcy,
31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615 (1978) (reprinted in 85 COMM. L.J. 238 (1980)); Note, Bankruptcy
Exemptions: State Law or Federal Policy? 35 U. PIr. L. REV. 630 (1974).
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exemption statutes help achieve the first goal by exempting certain
property of individual debtors4 from the claims of creditors. Since
exempt property is unavailable to satisfy creditor claims, however, the
courts must balance the scope of these exemption laws against the
second goal of fair creditor distributions.
When attorneys discuss exemptions with debtors on the verge of
bankruptcy, they become involved in this balancing act. Once in-
formed about exempt property, a debtor will be tempted to salvage as
many assets as possible.' The debtor will likely ask the attorney
whether (and, to the debtor most importantly, how) the debtor can
purchase, improve or otherwise convert nonexempt property to ex-
empt property before filing. This discussion often occurs on the very
eve of bankruptcy, and the decision of whether to convert nonexempt
property immediately follows. For the purposes of this article, the
term "asset conversion" means the acquisition, improvement, transfer
or other conversion of nonexempt property into exempt property.
I. PURPOSES OF EXEMPTIONS AND CRITICISMS
Arkansas' constitutional6 and statutory7 exemptions further nu-
merous debtor protection goals,8 and the Arkansas Supreme Court
4. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Personal property exemptions of persons ..... )
(emphasis added).
5. See Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: The Development of its Struc-
tural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of Consumer Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 291 (1978):
[W]hen discussing both collection of the estate and discharge, one should be aware
that the debtor and his creditors are engaged in what could be described as a great
game. The goal of the game for the debtor is to retain as much property as possible
despite the bankruptcy proceeding. The exemption provisions of state and federal
law are the most plainly relevant tools for achieving this goal.
Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
6. ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 to 10, amended by Amendment No. 22.
7. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-218 (1987) lists certain statutory exemptions and cross ref-
erences numerous others.
8. Resnick, supra note 3, at 620. In his article, Professor Resnick suggests that histori-
cally exemption laws promoted five distinct social policies:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his physical survival;
(2) To protect the dignity and the cultural and religious identity of the debtor;
(3) To enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in
the future;
(4) To protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of impover-
ishment;
(5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor and his family with minimal
financial support from society to the debtor's creditors.
Id. at 621. See also Sannoner v. King, 49 Ark. 299, 301, 5 S.W. 327, 328 (1887) ("The exemp-
tion law is generous and humane") and cases cited infra note 9.
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has repeatedly stated that the exemption statutes are to be liberally
construed to effect their intents and purposes.9 Many exemptions,
however, have remained relatively unchanged since their enactment
in the early twentieth century, and commentators have criticized
some state exemption laws as being obsolete or overly generous. 10
Prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(Bankruptcy Code),"I federal bankruptcy law incorporated state and
federal exemptions by reference.' 2 Section 522 of the Bankruptcy
Code adopted uniform federal exemptions 3 which answered many of
these criticisms by implementing maximum dollar limitations, while
providing minimum level exemptions for debtors who lived in states
having very restrictive exemptions.' 4 As a Senate/House compro-
mise, however, section 522(b)(1) allowed states to affirmatively deter-
mine whether federal exemptions would apply as an alternative to
their exemptions.
In 1981, Arkansas elected not to incorporate the federal exemp-
tions into Arkansas bankruptcies.' 5 Thus, generous, and possibly ob-
solete, exemptions provided by Arkansas law may enable debtors to
keep property beyond the reach of creditors when no social policy is
served. For example, the homestead exemption provided by Arkan-
sas' Constitution has no value limitation for the minimum homesteads
and may permit debtors to shield 100% of their homestead equity
from creditors:' 6 $10,000, $100,000 or $1,000,000, there is no limit.
Debtors may compound this inequity if they are encouraged or per-
mitted to purchase, improve or otherwise convert nonexempt prop-
erty into exempt property immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy.
Although Arkansas exemption statutes do not directly address this
asset conversion process, creditors and courts faced with it across the
nation have invoked numerous techniques "to prevent abuses by
9. In re Stone, 116 F. 35 (E.D. Ark. 1902); Williams v. Swann, 220 Ark. 906, 251
S.W.2d 111 (1952); City Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 192 Ark. 945, 96 S.W.2d 482 (1936); Bunting
v. Rollins, 189 Ark. 12, 70 S.W.2d 40 (1934); Pemberton v. Bank of Eastern Ark., 173 Ark.
949, 294 S.W. 64 (1927); Davis v. Cramer, 133 Ark. 224, 202 S.W. 239 (1918).
10. See Countryman, Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals,
19 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 167 (1971); Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Moderniza-
tion, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 375 (1959).
11. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
12. 11 U.S.C. §§ 24 & 26 (1976) (repealed by the Bankruptcy Code).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-217 (1987).
16. ARK. CONST. art. IX, §§ 4-5 provides 80 acre rural and 'A acre urban homesteads
"without regard to value."
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either creditors or debtors."' 7 These include: (1) an interpretation of
the facts of the exemption claim to determine that the exemption stat-
ute does not apply; (2) to the extent permitted by state law, disallow-
ance of the exemption claim for actual fraud or, if a transfer is
involved, actual or constructive fraud; and (3) denial of discharge in
bankruptcy under section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code for (a) actual
fraud in the asset conversion or (b) failure to properly disclose the
asset conversion.
Approximately fifty-eight percent of the post-1978 bankruptcy
court decisions reviewed for this article and dealing with asset conver-
sions have applied one or more of these techniques against the debtor,
with a resulting loss of exemption or denial of discharge.18 Although
not an all-inclusive list of cases, the percentage of disapproval sends a
clear judicial signal which debtors and attorneys must not ignore.
Consequently, debtors and attorneys considering an asset conversion
must carefully consider the boundaries of what the courts will permit.
II. ASSET CONVERSION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
THE PER SE RULE
A. General
Under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, property of the
debtor automatically becomes property of the bankruptcy estate upon
17. In re Reid, 757 F.2d 230, 236 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Fisher, 11 Bankr. 666,
669 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981)).
18. Cases allowing the conversion include: In re Elliott, 79 Bankr. 944 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987); In re Swift, 72 Bankr. 563 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987); In re O'Brien, 67 Bankr. 317
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Ellingson, 63 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re
Breuer, 68 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); In re Blum, 41 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1984); In re Hanson, 41 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); Levine v. Judson, 40 Bankr. 76
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Olson, 45 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Theisen v. Berg-
quist, 45 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Butts, 45 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984);
In re Barash, 69 Bankr. 231 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); In re James, 31 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1983); In re Ayers, 25 Bankr. 762 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Johnson, 8 Bankr. 650
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1981). Cases disallowing the conversion include: In re Compton, 70 Bankr. 60
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Thur-
mond, 71 Bankr. 596 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); In re Mueller, 71 Bankr. 165 (D. Kan. 1987); In re
Edwards, 56 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); In re Sayler, 68 Bankr. 111 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1986); In re Ford, 53 Bankr. 444 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); In re Porter, 37 Bankr. 56 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1984); In re Saunders, 37 Bankr. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Oliver, 38
Bankr. 407 (Bankr. Mass. 1984); In re Hall, 31 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re
Wallace, 30 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1983); In re White, 38 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1983); In re Hallman, 26 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Mickelson v. Anderson, 31
Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982); In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In
re Vissers, 21 Bankr. 638 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1981); In re Butz, 17 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
722
1987-88] NONEXEMPT PROPERTY CONVERSION 723
filing for relief.19 Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, al-
lows an individual debtor to exempt certain property from the es-
tate.2°  Since Arkansas has preempted the standard federal
exemptions, Arkansas law governs the applicability, interpretation
and scope of exemption claims made in an Arkansas bankruptcy. 21
Procedurally, Bankruptcy Rule 4003 requires the debtor to list
all property claimed as exempt on the schedule of assets filed pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 1007.22 Exemptions must be claimed by the
debtor upon the filing of a voluntary case, or within fifteen days after
the filing of an involuntary case, unless an extension of time for filing
is granted.23 Objections to a claim of exemption must be made by the
trustee or any creditor within thirty days after the conclusion of the
section 341 meeting of creditors. 24 If an objection is made, the bank-
ruptcy court will consider its merits. Consistent with Arkansas' re-
quirement that its exemption statutes be liberally construed, the
"objecting party has the burden of proving that the exemptions are
not properly claimed."' 25 Challenges to exemptions may be made
under sections 547 (Preferences), 26 548 (Fraudulent Transfers and
Obligations) 27 and 544 (Trustee as Lien Creditor and as Successor to
Certain Creditors and Purchasers) 28 of the Bankruptcy Code. Most
asset conversion cases employ sections 544 and 548 claims rather than
section 547 preference claims since many asset conversions do not
meet the preference tests of subsections 547(b)(2) and 547(b)(5). 29
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Jackson, 472 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1973);
Elliott v. Ostman, 340 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1965); In re Olson, 45 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984).
22. BANKR. R. 1007(b). See Official Form 6, Schedule B-4 which requires the debtor to
state (1) a description of the type of property, (2) the location and, to the extent required by
the claimed exemption, use of such property, (3) the statute creating the exemption and (4) the
value of the property claimed as exempt.
23. BANKR. R. 1007(c). See also BANKR. R. 1009(a) which allows the debtor in a volun-
tary case to amend schedules "as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed."
24. BANKR. R. 4003(b).
25. BANKR. R. 4003(c).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
29. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 (b)(2) & (b)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For another example 11
U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) requires that the preference transfer be "to or for
the benefit of a creditor." Usually exemption conversions do not involve a creditor. The re-
cent case of In Re Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 839 (Bankr. W.D. Fla. 1987), suggests that an asset
conversion on the eve of bankruptcy may justify dismissal for a bad faith filing.
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B. The Per Se Rule
The legislative history to section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code
expressly considers asset conversions. Based on 1975 and 1976 hear-
ings, the Senate and House reports observe that:
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert
non-exempt property into exempt property before filing a bank-
ruptcy petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and
permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he
is entitled under the law. °
This statement appears to strongly support a debtor's right to convert
nonexempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy.
In fact, in several cases 31 the debtors apparently relied on little more
to justify their actions. Such reliance is misplaced. As is sometimes
the case with legislative history, the summary of "current law" given
in the Senate and House reports overstates the judicial rule.3 2 The
early case of Crawford v. Sternberg more accurately defines the rule as
follows:
It is well settled that it is not a fraudulent act by an individual who
knows he is insolvent to convert a part of his property which is not
exempt into property which is exempt, for the purpose of claiming
his exemptions therein, and of thereby placing it out of the reach of
his creditors .. .
30. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 361 and S. REP. No. 95-989 at 76, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
31. See, e.g., In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Reed, 11 Bankr.
683 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
32. The bankruptcy court in Mickelson v. Anderson, 31 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982) went further. In commenting on the debtor's reliance on the legislative history set out in
the West Publication of the Bankruptcy Code, the court stated as follows:
The course of the legislative proposals which eventually became the Bankruptcy
Code was unusual with the result that even Committee Reports are often ambiguous
and confusing, often contradictory and sometimes in total error when applied to the
end legislative product. The comment quoted from West is subject to those frailties.
Examination of the legislative proceedings pinpoints the source of the assertion to be
in a letter addressed to Congressman Don Edwards by Bankruptcy Judge Phelps of
the Central District of California calling attention to the law apparently prevailing in
the Ninth Circuit which permitted such prebankruptcy planning and conversion of
non-exempt assets into exempt assets as preliminary to his suggestion that such
prebankruptcy planning and conversion of assets should be forfended in the proposed
Code. The discussion at the hearing following receipt of the letter was cursory and
with no positive indication that such rule of law was universal. Accordingly the
West note lacks authority, and the text of the Code does not expressly deal with the
question.
31 Bankr. at 637. See also In re Butts, 45 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
33. Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73, 76 (8th Cir. 1915) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 10:719
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Generally this holding means that "the conversion of nonexempt to
exempt property by a debtor is not, in and of itself, a fraud on credi-
tors."34 This per se rule was apparently adopted in the 1913 Arkansas
Supreme Court decision of Littleton v. Carruthers-Jones Shoe Co. 35
which approved the trade of goods purchased on credit by an insol-
vent debtor for an exempt homestead. In allowing the transaction,
the court adopted the earlier holding of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in First National Bank v. Glass:36
An insolvent debtor may use with impunity any of his property
that is free from the liens and vested equitable interest of his credi-
tors to purchase a homestead for himself and his family in his own
name. If he takes property that is not exempt from judicial sale
and applies it to this purpose, he merely avails himself of a plain
provision of the Constitution or the statute enacted for the benefit
of himself and his family. He takes nothing from his creditors by
this action in which they have any vested right.37
This conclusion is supported by other general legal principles which
require that (1) fraud must be clearly shown and cannot be pre-
sumed38 and (2) fraud cannot be predicated upon an act which a party
had a right by law to do.39 Courts have also applied these principles
to help justify upholding exemptions acquired (or created) on the eve
of bankruptcy. For example, one court utilized these principles to
approve an exemption acquired through an asset conversion just one
day before commencement of the bankruptcy action.4°
34. See Resnick, supra note 3, at 630. For early cases supporting this conclusion see In re
Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Jackson, 472 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1971); Wudrick v.
Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945);
Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1926); In re Dudley, 72 F. Supp. 943
(S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd sub nom. Goggins v. Dudley, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948); In re
Hammonds, 198 F. 574 (E.D. Ky. 1912); Kelly v. Sparks, 54 F. 70 (C.C.D. Kan. 1893).
35. 109 Ark. 493, 160 S.W. 397 (1913).
36. 79 F. 706 (8th Cir. 1897).
37. Id. at 707. In Littleton the Arkansas Supreme Court also quotes with approval the
language of Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 43 N.W. 52 (1889) as follows:
Even if he disposes of his property subject to execution, for the very purpose of con-
verting the proceeds into exempt property, this will not constitute legal fraud. This
he may do at any time before the creditors acquire a lien upon the property. It is a
right which the law gives him, subject to which every one gives him credit, and fraud
can never be predicated on an act which the law permits.
109 Ark. at 496, 160 S.W. at 398.
38. In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co., Inc., 61 Bankr. 750 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986);
Killian v. Hayes Bros. Lumber Co., 251 Ark. 121, 470 S.W.2d 939 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Jewell v. Allen, 109 P.2d 235, 237 (Okla. 1940) (citing with approval Sachs v.
Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 185 N.E. 856 (1933), reh'g denied, 206 Ind. 151, 188 N.E. 674 (1934)).
40. Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73 (8th Cir. 1915). For other examples of asset conver-
sions within a short time of bankruptcy see Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965) (2
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III. BEWARE OF THE PER SE RULE-TECHNIQUES TO
CHALLENGE ASSET CONVERSIONS
A. Interpretation of the Facts to Make an Exemption Statute
Inapplicable
State law determines the applicability and scope of an exemption
claim. Thus, a court can completely avoid the asset conversion issue
by finding that the resulting exemption claim is not effective under
applicable state law. Two 1987 Oklahoma cases, In re Reid4 and In
re Goldberg,42 demonstrate the willingness of bankruptcy courts to
interpret the facts in such a way as to make an exemption statute
inapplicable. In Reid the Bankruptcy Court determined that fifteen
religious paintings valued at approximately $187,000 and received in
exchange for the forgiveness of valid third party business debt owed to
them were not "held primarily for personal, family and household
use" as required by the exemption statute.43 This decision was based
on (1) testimony by the debtors that they received the paintings in
payment of a business debt, pledged them to secure business loans and
expressed a pre-bankruptcy willingness to sell some of the paintings to
pay off a business loan and (2) the separate classification of the paint-
ings in bankruptcy schedules by the debtors as a "collection" rather
than household goods. In Goldberg the Bankruptcy Court held that a
gold chain and ten dollar gold piece pendent worn by the debtor were
not exempt as wearing apparel under Oklahoma law since they "rep-
resent more than just ornamentation and wearing apparel. They rep-
resent an investment."" Such characterizations meant that these
items were not held primarily for personal nor family or household
use as required by Oklahoma's exemption laws. An indication of
what may be the real reasoning behind these decisions, however, is
given by the following language from the Reid decision which upheld
the Bankruptcy Court:
We believe that we are acting consistently with the purposes of the
Oklahoma exemption statute and 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f) ....
days); In re Irvin, 120 F. 733 (8th Cir. 1903) (6 days); In re Ayers, 25 Bankr. 762 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1982) (less than 30 days); In re Dudley, 72 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd
sub nom. Goggin v. Dudley, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1948). C.f In re Elliott, 79 Bankr. 944
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (challenge brought almost two and one-half years after the transfer
was disallowed).
41. 757 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1985) (appealed from N.D. Oklahoma).
42. 59 Bankr. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
43. 757 F.2d at 232.
44. 59 Bankr. at 208. See also In re Mims, 49 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
[Vol. 10:719
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This case does not involve "inconsiderate creditors" depriving
debtors of the necessities of life, nor was it improper for the bank-
ruptcy court to find that the paintings were not primarily used for
maintenance of debtor's home.4"
Thus, the Goldberg and Reid courts balanced the claims of the credi-
tor against how well the exemption served its underlying policy of
giving the debtor a fresh start. Of necessity, this balancing focuses on
the value of the property protected by the exemption claim. The real
concern of the courts is whether the value of the exempt property
significantly exceeds what a debtor needs to support himself and his
dependents.
The Bankruptcy Code and certain states sometimes have specifi-
cally incorporated a necessity standard into exemptions. For exam-
ple, section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts payments
under any "stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan . . . to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and any dependent . . ." unless certain conditions are met.46
Several states have adopted similar limitations by restricting exemp-
tions for debtor-created retirement plans to specific amounts or by
imposing a similar "reasonable necessity" standard." Arkansas in
certain instances has followed the same path by specifying values such
as $1,200 for one motor vehicle, $750 in trade implements or a quan-
tity such as one-half carat for wedding ring diamonds.48 Courts
which apply a balancing approach, however, do not have the ability to
impose a necessity or dollar standard, since their choice is only to
allow or disallow the exemption. Such an "all or nothing" approach
forces courts to make what may sometimes be questionable distinc-
tions and does not allow the debtor to introduce evidence of need.
45. 757 F.2d at 236.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10)(D) (1982) ("alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor").
47. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-503 (1981) (limited to $200 per month for the debtor
and $60 per month for dependents). For statutes based on a necessity standard see GA. CODE
ANN. § 44-13-100(2)(e) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 11-604(1)(e) (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 110, § 12-1001 (1987-88); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 4422(13)(E) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.16, 550.37(24) (Supp. 1988);
OHIO REV. STAT. § 2329.66(A)(10) (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § 1(A)(20) (Supp.
1987-88); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1987).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-218 (1987).
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B. Denial of an Exemption Claim for Actual
or Constructive Fraud
1. General
The per se conversion rule implies a more general rule: the con-
version of nonexempt property into exempt property prior to filing
bankruptcy is not always proper.4 9 Thus, it has been said that exemp-
tion claims are not allowed when the debtor has committed "actual or
extrinsic fraud" in connection with the asset conversion.5" As used in
this context, actual fraud is broader than mere misrepresentation and
includes fraud such as is prohibited by fraudulent conveyance limita-
tions-that is, actions which enable a debtor to gain an unfair advan-
tage over creditors.51 Such fraud must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence52 but may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence surrounding the asset conversion transaction. 53
Fraud exceptions to exemption claims raise numerous questions
such as: (1) what facts constitute actual fraud; (2) what part should
the debtor's motive play in finding fraud; (3) are asset conversions
which involve transfers subject to challenge for constructive fraud;54
and (4) what remedies are available to creditors who successfully
challenge exemption claims? These questions will be examined in de-
tail below. However, a threshold question must first be answered:
Does applicable Arkansas law or the Bankruptcy Code permit disal-
lowance of an exemption for fraud? Many cases assume without dis-
49. See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, most courts applying state exemption laws, had
held property that would otherwise have been exempt to be deprived of its immunity
if there was evidence other than the simple act of conversion showing that the debtor
had acquired it with the intention of defrauding his creditors.
Id. at 990. See, e.g., In re Miguel v. Walsh, 447 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1971); Shanks v. Hardin,
101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir. 1920); In re Gerber, 186 F.
693 (9th Cir. 1911).
50. Resnick, supra note 3, at 633. "Actual fraud" as used in the context of this article is
broader than fraud based on misrepresentation. See Wright v. Cies, 648 P.2d 51 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1982): "Fraud is a generic term embracing every means human ingenuity can invent to
enable one person to gain an unfair advantage over another .... " Id. at 53. See also Cooper v.
Fort Smith & W.R. Co., 23 Okla. 139, 150, 99 P. 785, 789 (1909) (quoting KERR, FRAUD AND
MISTAKE 42 (1877): "All surprises, trick, cunning, dissembling, and other unfair way that is
used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud.").
51. See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 460 F.2d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1972) (actual fraud includes
the successful employment of cunning, deception or artifice to circumvent, cheat or deceive
(citing Mazander v. Reed, 233 Ark. 511, 514, 345 S.W.2d 469, 471 (1961)).
52. Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1965).
53. In re White, 28 Bankr. 240, 243 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
59-204(b) (Supp. 1987).
54. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-204(a)(2), -205 (Supp. 1987).
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cussion that such a fraud exception does exist. Sometimes state
exemption statutes expressly incorporate fraud exceptions. For exam-
ple, Oklahoma's statutory exemption for the proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy contains an exception for "the amount of any premiums
for such insurance paid in fraud of creditors . . . ."5 No similar ex-
press exceptions, however, are provided in Arkansas' constitutional
homestead and other general statutory exemptions. This absence
presents serious problems for creditors challenging an Arkansas ex-
emption claim for fraud.
2. Disallowance of An Exemption for Fraud
in Arkansas Bankruptcies
a. General
Whether an exemption can be defeated by a fraudulent pre-bank-
ruptcy asset conversion is usually considered a question of state law.56
For example, the Texas case of In re Reed "interpreted Texas law to
allow the exemption in full regardless of [the debtor's] intent." 57
Thus, in Texas, it may not be possible to challenge an asset conversion
to a homestead which involves any type of fraud.5" Arkansas' law in
this area is not completely settled, since no cases expressly state such
a blanket rule. Numerous Arkansas cases have considered fraudulent
conveyance challenges involving exempt property. Generally, these
cases have held that property exempt in the hands of the debtor prior
to transfer is not subject to creditor claims. The reason is simple: The
creditor "was not in a position to complain of the attempted disposi-
tion of any part of [debtor's] homestead, whether by voluntary con-
veyance or otherwise, since it was not subject to the payment of its
claim or judgment, and, as to the homestead, there are no debts or
creditors." 9 Such reasoning does not apply to the transfer of nonex-
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3631(b) (1976).
56. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983). See also cases cited supra note 34.
57. 700 F.2d at 990.
58. See also In re Theisen, 45 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). The court indicates
doubt about whether Minnesota fraudulent conversion law can overcome Minnesota exemp-
tion law:
To sum up, I think that absent some sort of sheltering of fraudulently obtained
money it is within the purview of the Minnesota exemption laws to allow the so-
called conversion of non-exempt property into exempt property. Such conversion is
not properly grounds for an objection to a claim of exemption made under Minnesota
law.
Id. at 130-31.
59. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Smith, 103 Ark. 145, 150, 147 S.W. 54, 56
(1912). See also Bank of Salem v. White, 205 Ark. 852, 171 S.W.2d 55 (1943); Bank of Dover
v. Jones, 192 Ark. 740, 95 S.W.2d 92 (1936); Middleton v. McCoy, 188 Ark. 359, 65 S.W.2d
729
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empt assets.
One commentator stated that "non-exempt property may ordina-
rily be exchanged for exempt property, subject again to the limitation
that there be no lien existing against the non-exempt property."'
This conclusion probably is no more than a restatement of the per se
rule, with the caveat that liens survive a transfer. 61 The same com-
mentator noted three other exceptions to otherwise valid exemption
claims recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court:62 (1) cash pro-
ceeds from the sale of exempt property, themselves exempt, may be
reached by creditors while held as money; 63 (2) exempt property ac-
quired by a trustee with wrongfully appropriated trust property may
be subject to creditors;' and (3) a wife may set aside a husband's
fraudulent transfer of his homestead to defeat her dower. 65 None of
these exceptions, however, are directly on point as to whether or not
Arkansas recognizes a general fraud exception to exemption claims.
In Littleton v. Carruthers-Jones Shoe Co. 66 the debtor incurred
debt for stock purchased for his business. He then exchanged the
stock for a farm which he subsequently made his homestead. While
adopting the per se rule, the Arkansas Supreme Court discussed an
apparent fraud exception in dicta:
Now, the rule might be different if the proof was sufficient to
show that the goods were purchased from [the creditor] with the
fraudulent intent not to pay for them, for in that case the title
would never have passed on account of the fraud thus practiced,
and the creditor might in equity be permitted to trace the proceeds
of his misappropriated property into the property in which the pro-
ceeds were invested. But we have no such case here, for there is no
proof at all to the effect that [the debtor] purchased the goods with
intention not to pay for them, or that he was insolvent at the time
he purchased the goods, or that he misrepresented his financial
condition .. .[T]he only fraud, if any there be, consisted in his
disposing of the goods without leaving enough to pay his creditors.
As already shown, according to the principles settled by the deci-
sions of this court, fraud in that respect does not affect his right to
541 (1933); Barham v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 176 Ark. 1082, 5 S.W.2d 318 (1928); Sears v.
Setser, 111 Ark. 11, 162 S.W. 1083 (1914); Wilks v. Vaughan, 73 Ark. 174, 83 S.W. 913
(1904); Sannoner v. King, 49 Ark. 299, 5 S.W. 327 (1887).
60. Comment, Fraudulent Conveyances in Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REV. 149, 150 (1965).
61. Id. at 150 & n.17.
62. Id. at 151.
63. Id. (citing Tucker v. Stell, 169 Ark. 1, 272 S.W. 864 (1925)).
64. Id. (citing Reaves v. Coffman, 87 Ark. 60, 112 S.W. 144 (1908)).
65. Id. (citing Harrison v. Harrison, 198 Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939)).
66. 109 Ark. 493, 160 S.W. 397 (1913).
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hold as exempt the property acquired by exchange.
But this language must be compared to the result in Ponder v. Jeffer-
son Standard Life Ins. Co. ,68 in which the creditor attempted to reach
the exempt proceeds of a life insurance policy which proceeds were
obtained by the alleged fraudulent conduct of the beneficiary. In de-
nying the creditor's claim the Arkansas Supreme Court, referring to
the exemption statute, held:
This language exempts all debts of whatever nature and in whatso-
ever manner incurred. This all-inclusive exemption may be unwise
and work injustice in cases, but with that we have no concern. We
repeat that this is a matter to be addressed to the judgment of the
General Assembly. We deem no authority necessary for our con-
clusion... but such courts as have passed upon statutes exempting
from process the avails of insurance policies have declined to read
into them any limitation not specifically expressed therein.69
Even if Littleton and Ponder can be reconciled, the Littleton exception
required that the debtor must have (1) purchased the goods with an
intent not to pay or (2) misrepresented this financial condition. This
is a very narrow fact pattern, although it most probably does occa-
sionally occur. Generally, no such intent or misrepresentation exists
because many times the nonexempt property transferred to obtain the
exempt property has been in the debtor's possession for some period
of time.
For similar reasons, equitable estoppel and waiver usually cannot
be applied to asset conversion cases.70 Equitable estoppel generally
requires (1) a false representation or concealment of facts, (2) made
with actual or constructive knowledge, (3) to a person without knowl-
edge concerning the truth of the representation or such facts, (4) with
intent that it be acted upon, (5) and the person to whom the false
representation or concealment is made acts in reliance on it, (6) to his
detriment.71 Although reliance and detriment may be easily estab-
lished in any particular asset conversion case, it is more difficult to
67. Id. at 496, 160 S.W. at 398.
68. 194 Ark. 829, 109 S.W.2d 946 (1937). It was alleged that the policy was obtained by a
fraudulent misstatement of age by the insured and that the beneficiaries in the proof of death
also fraudulently misstated the date of insured's birth.
69. Id. at 832-33, 109 S.W. at 948 (citing State v. Collins, 70 Okla. 323, 174 P. 568
(1918)); Clark v. Lunch, 31 N.Y.S. 1038 (1894)).
70. See, e.g., Sannoner v. King, 49 Ark. 299, 5 S.W. 327 (1887) (denying the use of estop-
pel in a fraudulent transfer of nonexempt assets).
71. See, e.g., Howard Bldg. Centre v. Thornton, 282 Ark. 1, 665 S.W.2d 870 (1984); Beth-
ell v. Bethell, 268 Ark. 409, 597 S.W.2d 576 (1980); Linda Elenia Asken Trust v. Hopkins, 15
Ark. App. 19, 688 S.W.2d 316 (1985). See also 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions § 168 (1968).
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meet the requirements that there be a false statement, knowingly
made by the debtor, without contrary knowledge of the creditor.
Similarly, waiver does not seem an appropriate tool. Waiver is
the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right, but a
waiver can be inferred from conduct. 72 For example, if a debtor
presented a financial statement which contained nonexempt assets it
can be argued that he has waived his right to later convert such assets
to nonexempt property or, equivalently, waived his right to invoke the
exemption claim. The problem with this argument is that it is difficult
to show that the debtor intended such a result. Given these remedial
limitations, it is necessary to look for other approaches which may
justify a challenge to an exemption for fraud. Statutory construction
appears to offer one such avenue.
b. Statutory Construction-The Relationship
Between Exemption Statutes and Fraudulent
Transfer Statutes
Arkansas' legislature has expressed a strong social policy against
fraud in asset conversion cases by permitting creditors to challenge
transfers which defraud, hinder or delay creditors under Arkansas'
Fraudulent Transfer Act.73 To allow an exemption claim acquired in
a manner which is covered by these statutes is inconsistent with the
legislative intent embodied in these fraudulent transfer laws.
It has been said that no statute should be interpreted wholly by
its own terms.74 Thus, courts have sometimes considered related stat-
utes to help interpret a statute if the enforcement of the related statute
impacts on the subject matter of the statute under consideration. This
is sometimes true even though the related statutes do not technically
cover the same subject.75  Although dealing with interpretational
questions involving clearly related statutes, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated as a rule of statutory construction that
legislative acts are to be construed in such manner as to reconcile the
different provisions, render them harmonious, and give intelligent ef-
fect to each.76 This interpretational rule should be extended to asset
72. For the definition of waiver see Keith v. City of Cave Springs, 233 Ark. 363, 377, 344
S.W.2d 591, 598 (1961); and, for implied waiver see Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036,
1039, 479 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1972).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -213 (Supp. 1987).
74. Cox v. St. Anthony Bank & Trust Co., 41 Idaho 776, 242 P. 785 (1925).
75. Walgreen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 323 Ill. 194, 153 N.E. 831 (1926); Clark v. Murray,
141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042 (1935) (Statutes which are on the same subject are generally said
to be "in pan materia."); Simpson County v. Burkett, 178 Miss. 44, 172 So. 329 (1937).
76. See In re Estate of Epperson, 284 Ark. 35, 679 S.W.2d 792 (1984), cert. denied, 471
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conversion cases.
Courts should read the Arkansas exemption provisions together
with Arkansas' fraudulent transfer provisions to allow creditors to in-
validate asset conversions involving transfers which act to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors. Courts in other jurisdictions have taken this
approach." Even if this is a modification of early Arkansas case law,
such a result is consistent with the modem view of exemption stat-
utes. It is also consistent with the Arkansas Supreme Court's position
that "[e]very citizen of Arkansas is entitled to exemptions, mentioned
in the Constitution and statutes, but in order to get his property ex-
empt he must comply with the law."' 78  Debtors who voluntarily
choose to ignore fraudulent transfer laws do not deserve the same
level of protection as innocent debtors.
Two caveats should be noted. First, this approach will not aid
creditors in situations which do not involve transfers. Second, since
the homestead exemption and certain personal property exemptions
are constitutional, their provisions may not be supplemented by legis-
lative acts like those discussed.
c. Section 548 Challenges to Exemption Claims
Although some courts have treated disallowance of an exemption
claim for actual or constructive fraud as purely a matter of state
law,79 others have applied the fraudulent transfer provisions of section
548 of the Bankruptcy Code80 to avoid an exemption claim without
reference to applicable state law. 8 ' The bankruptcy court in In re Oli-
ver 82 recognized a relationship between sections 522 and 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code as follows:
U.S. 1017 (1985); Gilbert v. Gilbert Timber Co., 19 Ark. App. 93, 719 S.W.2d 284 (1986),
aff'd, 292 Ark. 124, 728 S.W.2d 507 (1987).
77. See, e.g., In re Levine, 40 Bankr. 76, 79 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) ("Although the Flor-
ida Courts have recognized limited exceptions permitting a violation of the homestead protec-
tion, the exceptions are strictly construed. They are uniformly an equitable attempt to rectify
otherwise heinous and unjust circumstances."); In re Olsen, 45 Bankr. 501, 505 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984) ("Under present Minnesota law, in order to deny a homestead exemption where a
conversion occurs, it appears that a Court must find what amounts to a fraudulent conveyance
.... );infra note 111.
78. Griffin v. Puryear-Meyer Grocer Co., 202 Ark. 495, 499, 151 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1941)
(the creditor's claim arose because the third party did not comply with bulk sale rules).
79. E.g., In re Johnson, 8 Bankr. 650 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); Mickelson v. Anderson, 31
Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
81. In re Edwards, 56 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); In re Oliver, 38 Bankr. 407
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re White, 28 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
82. 38 Bankr. 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
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While the Court recognizes that under § 522 it is perfectly proper
and indeed may be good planning for a debtor to convert non-ex-
empt assets into those which are exempt, even on the eve of bank-
ruptcy, the Court also recognizes that under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) the
same transfer may be avoided ....
Thus, similar cases reason that although the existence of the exemp-
tion claim is a question of state law, the resulting claim is still subject
to challenge within the framework of the Bankruptcy Code.84 This
approach, however, is more restrictive to creditors because many as-
pects of Arkansas' fraudulent transfer rules are more liberal than
those of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 For example, section
548 is subject to a one year statute of limitation while Arkansas'
Fraudulent Transfer Act has limitations of up to four years.8 6
As the previous discussion demonstrates, the tension between
conflicting purposes has led courts to arrive at different conclusions
concerning whether state exemptions statutes are subject to fraudu-
lent transfer exceptions. One court has noted that "the right of ex-
emption is a personal privilege. Thus, courts carefully see that the
exemption laws are not construed so as to make them an instrument
of fraud."'8 7
3. Examples of Actual or Extrinsic Fraud Which Have
Resulted In a Denial of Exemption Claim
Assuming that it is possible to challenge an exemption claim for
fraud, it is next relevant to consider what actions might constitute the
kind of fraud which will cause the debtor to lose his exemption. Be-
cause it is unlikely that a debtor will testify that he acted either with
fraudulent intent or to delay, hinder or defraud his creditors, many
times a court must imply fraud from the particular circumstances of a
case."" Certain suspicious circumstances have long been recognized
by the courts as "badges" which stamp a transaction as fraudulent
without actual proof of a debtor's intent. Examples include the fol-
lowing: dealings with a spouse, relative or other related party;8 9 re-
tention of control/possession in the transferred property after the
83. Id. at 409 (citation omitted).
84. In re Theisen, 45 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-209 (Supp. 1987).
87. In re Hanson, 41 Bankr. 775, 778 (Bankr. D.N.D.) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 868 (1984).
88. See, e.g., Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
89. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 125 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1954); Connelly v. Thomas, 234
Ark. 1024, 356 S.W.2d 430 (1962); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(1) (Supp. 1987).
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transfer;9°  concealment of the transaction; 91  the debtor was
threatened with a suit or obtained a large loan just before making the
transfer;92 secrecy or concealment of the transferred property;9 3 insuf-
ficient consideration received by the debtor;94 insolvency of the
debtor;9 deviation from normal transaction formalities; 96 and transfer
of all of the debtor's property. 97 Generally, these factors are also use-
ful in analyzing an asset conversion case involving a transfer.
Courts faced with the conversion of nonexempt property into ex-
empt property on the eve of bankruptcy have relied on some of these
traditional indicia of fraud as well as general principles of equity to
deny exemption claims. Following are some examples of the circum-
stances under which exemption claims resulting from conversions
have been disallowed:
1. Obtaining exempt property with funds resulting
from the sale of goods purchased on credit and for which
payment was not made.98
2. Investing substantial assets in exempt property af-
ter inducing the creditor to withdraw an involuntary bank-
ruptcy petition.99
3. Conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets
after a federal court order prohibiting the disposition of as-
sets pending a further hearing."
90. See, e.g., Davis, Mallory & Co. v. Meyer & Co., 47 Ark. 210, 1 S.W. 95 (1886); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(2) (Supp. 1987).
91. See, e.g., Slayden-Kirksey Wollen Mills v. Anderson, 66 Ark. 419, 50 S.W. 994 (1899)
(husband placed purchased assets in name of wife); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-204(b)(3), (7)
(Supp. 1987).
92. See, e.g., Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Weese v.
Weese, 191 Minn. 526, 254 N.W. 816 (1934); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-204(b)(4), (10) (Supp.
1987).
93. See, e.g., In re Baugh, 60 Bankr. 102 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-59-204(b)(3), (7) (Supp. 1987).
94. See, e.g., In re Baugh, 60 Bankr. 102; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(8) (Supp.
1987).
95. See, e.g., In re Baugh, 60 Bankr. 102. See also Pergrem v. Smith, 255 S.W.2d 42 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1953); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(9) (Supp. 1987).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914
(1961).
97. See, e.g., Winner v. Hoyt, 66 Wis. 227, 28 N.W. 380 (1886); Texas Sand Co. v. Shield,
381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1964).
98. See, e.g., Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir. 1920); In re White, 221 F. Supp. 64
(N.D. Cal. 1963); Stoner v. Walsh, 24 Cal. App. 3d 938, 101 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1972); Jones v.
Carpenter, 90 Fla. App. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925).
99. See, e.g., In re Gerber, 186 F. 693 (9th Cir. 1911).
100. See, e.g., Mott v. Groves, 428 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Butz v. Blue, 5
Bankr. 723 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (conversion occurred after bankruptcy filing).
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4. Withdrawal of funds from business accounts for
the purpose of investing in exempt property.10'
5. Conversion of nonexempt property with a value
sufficient to pay all creditor claims into exempt property. 0 2
6. Conversion of nonexempt property to exempt
property which does not provide the debtor the use of newly
acquired property.10 3
Just as the presence of certain facts in a case is an indication of
fraud, the presence of others have been found insufficient by them-
selves to show fraud. For example, the per se rule already discussed
states that the mere act of conversion is not in and of itself enough to
prove fraud. Other circumstances which, without more, have not
been determinative of fraud include:
1. The fact that a conversion creates a preference in
favor of the debtor.1°4
2. The value of the exempt property acquired. 0 5
3. The amount of time between the acquisition or
conversion and bankruptcy.' ° 6
4. The fact that the debtor converts nonexempt prop-
erty into exempt property at a time when he knows he is
insolvent and fully expects to become bankrupt.0 7
5. Receipt of exemption advice from an attorney im-
mediately prior to declaring bankruptcy. °'0
101. In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 683
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981); In re Mehrer, 2 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1980).
102. In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
103. In re Schwingle, 15 Bankr. 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981) (Debtor had a life estate in a
house which was exempt under state law. Subsequently, the debtor used nonexempt property
to purchase an exempt-free interest in the same house.).
104. See, e.g., Driggs & Co.'s Bank v. Norwood, 50 Ark. 42, 6 S.W. 323 (1887); Ouachita
Electric Co-op. Corp. v. Evans- St. Clair, 12 Ark. App. 171, 672 S.W.2d 660 (1984).
105. This conclusion is based on cases involving large conversions where the courts do not
even mention amount. See, e.g., In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976) (The debtor pre-
paid more than $50,000 of life insurance premiums with proceeds from the sale of her house to
an aunt and uncle. The court did not consider the amount at all in its conclusion). Cf In re
Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
106. The following cases allowed the conversion despite short time periods between conver-
sion and bankruptcy: In re Jackson, 472 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1973) ("shortly before"); Love v.
Menick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965) (2 days); Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73 (8th Cir.
1915) (1 day); In re Ayers, 25 Bankr. 762 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (less than 30 days); In re
Johnson, 8 Bankr. 650 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981) ("on the eve of bankruptcy"). Contra In re Reed,
700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983) ("His rapid conversion of nonexempt assets.. . speaks for
itself as a transfer of property in fraud of creditors.").
107. Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); Schwartz v. Seldon, 153 F.2d 334
(2d Cir. 1945).
108. Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Martin, 217 F. Supp. 937
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This is a difficult area to generalize since the fraud law of differ-
ent jurisdictions varies widely. It is not unusual for essentially identi-
cal cases to reach opposite results. 19
4. Motive in Determining Intent
Some decisions have found that the purpose for which the ex-
empt property was acquired is an important factor in determining
whether the asset conversion was a fraud on creditors."10 This ap-
proach has been criticized as being inconclusive since most debtors
act for multiple purposes.III A debtor who converts nonexempt prop-
erty into an exempt homestead probably is motivated both by his de-
sire for a new homestead and by a desire to deprive his creditors of his
assets. An asset conversion case should not turn on the skillful ques-
tioning of an attorney or the artful answer of the debtor. The motive
test, however, encourages just such tactics and, therefore, should not
be decisive in finding actual fraud.
5. Transfers v. Pure Conversions
Some courts have permitted the use of constructive fraud under
Bankruptcy Code section 548(a)(2) to invalidate a conversion. This is
obviously a powerful tool which obviates the necessity of finding ac-
tual fraudulent intent. Constructive fraud under the Arkansas Fraud-
ulent Transfer Act, however, requires a transfer which is defined to
include "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, vol-
untary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an
interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease,
(D. Or. 1963); In re Levine, 40 Bankr. 76 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Saunders, 37 Bankr.
766 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Hall, 31 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Wal-
lace, 30 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1983); Mickelson v. Anderson, 31 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1982); In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Johnson, 8 Bankr.
650 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981). Cf In re Sayler, 68 Bankr. 111 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
109. Compare In re White, 28 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) with In re Oliver, 38
Bankr. 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984). On almost identical facts, White found actual fraud while
Oliver did not.
110. Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir.
1920); In re Majors, 241 F. 538 (D. Or. 1917).
111. Resnick, supra note 3, at 638. Professor Resnick observes:
In theory, it is logical to distinguish between situations that involve an intent to
deprive creditors of assets and situations in which the debtor's purpose is actually to
acquire the exempt property. Bankruptcy legislation and state exemptions laws were
not designed to protect the debtor who acts in bad faith to deprive his creditors of
assets. The debtor who obtains exempt property because he has a good faith desire to
own such property is not acting with fraudulent intent and, therefore, should be
permitted to keep the property free of creditors' claims.
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and creation of a lien or other encumbrance."' 2 Thus, it is first nec-
essary to distinguish between a conversion that involves a transfer or
acquisition of exempt property and one which is a pure conversion of
already owned nonexempt property into exempt property. In re Ol-
son 13 presents this latter situation. Immediately prior to filing bank-
ruptcy, the debtors liquidated stock, bonds, certificates of deposit and
savings accounts already owned by them and used the proceeds to
make payments on the mortgages which encumbered their home-
stead. This fact situation should be distinguished from an actual
transfer such as occurred in In re White.I 4 In White the debtor con-
veyed his homestead from himself to himself and his wife as tenants
by the entirety, thereby taking advantage of an exemption provided by
section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. In denying the exemp-
tion, the court distinguished the transfer situation from a pure conver-
sion as follows:
In the instant case this Court concludes that [the debtor]
failed to convert his nonexempt property into exempt property.
First, it is clear that this is a two party transfer in which the debtor
attempted to transform his nonexempt property into exempt prop-
erty by transferring an interest in that property to another person.
The rule which permits conversion to nonexempt property is
clearly inapplicable here . . . . In the instant case, [debtor] at-
tempted to exempt his property by conveying part interest to his
wife instead of retaining an entire interest in the property and con-
verting it into exempt property."5
Asset conversions involving an improvement and change of char-
acter emphasizes the distinction drawn by White. For example, in In
re Hall 1 6 the debtor was constructing an addition to his business
which was to be used as a showroom. During divorce proceedings
and in contemplation of bankruptcy, the debtor moved into the addi-
tion and installed drapes, electricity, carpeting and heating, but not
kitchen or bathroom facilities. Subsequently, the debtor filed bank-
ruptcy and claimed that the addition was his homestead and therefore
exempt under applicable state law. Although the bankruptcy court
found this to be a fraudulent asset conversion under applicable state
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-201(12) (Supp. 1987).
113. 45 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D.. Minn. 1984).
114. 28 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
115. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). See also In re Porter, 37 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1984).
116. 31 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
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law, ' 7 there was clearly no transfer which invoked state fraudulent
transfer laws.
As used by the White court, the transfer/pure conversion distinc-
tion becomes important in determining what type of fraud, that is,
actual or constructive, is sufficient to avoid an exemption under state
law. Clearly, without a transfer, constructive fraud cannot be in-
voked. Additionally, in states like Arkansas, the lack of a transfer
may mean that an exemption such as claimed in Hall is permissible.
6 The Use of Bankruptcy Code Section 548(a)(2) Constructive
Fraud in Transfer Cases
Assuming that fraud can be used in Arkansas to attack a nonex-
empt/exempt property conversion, it becomes even more powerful as
a creditor's tool if a finding of constructive fraud under Bankruptcy
Code section 548(a)(2) is permitted. Difficult proof problems associ-
ated with actual fraud are avoided. For example, if a debtor is insol-
vent at the time of the transfer and receives nothing of value for the
transfer, it has been held that: "The rule condoning property conver-
sion from non-exempt to exempt property is inapplicable if the ele-
ments of a fraudulent conveyance are determined to exist .... "
The 1984 decision In re Oliver 119 presents a strong example of
how this rule can be used. Ninety days before declaring bankruptcy,
the debtor husband conveyed certain property owned by him and his
wife as tenants in the entirety to a strawman who immediately recon-
veyed the same property back to the debtor and his wife so that their
ownership of the property would be subject to a Massachusetts statute
which would exempt that property from the claims of the debtor's
creditors. On a motion for summary judgment, the Oliver bankruptcy
court determined that the question of actual fraud was a factual ques-
tion as to which summary judgment was not appropriate.120 The
bankruptcy court, however, granted the creditor's motion based on
constructive fraud under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code as
a matter of law since (1) the transfer took place when the debtor was
insolvent and (2) the debtor received nothing for the transfer. A simi-
lar approach has been taken in other cases, 12 1 particularly those as-
117. The bankruptcy court itself does not make the transfer distinction and indeed bases its
opinion on Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939), which involved actual transfers.
118. Butz v. Wheeler, 17 Bankr. 85, 89 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
119. 38 Bankr. 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
120. Id. at 410. The court refused to find that the facts (i) of the conversion and (ii) that a
family member was involved were sufficient as a matter of law to show fraudulent intent.
121. In re Edwards, 56 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986) (real property and automobile);
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serting an exemption under section 522(b)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code for property owned jointly or as a tenancy by the entirety.'22
Such a technique avoids balancing the needs of the debtors and credi-
tors and, given Arkansas' four-year statute of limitations for construc-
tive fraud, may be particularly harsh on debtors. 123
7. Remedies Available to the Creditor Who Successfully
Challenges an Exemption Claim for Fraud
In many states the remedies available to a creditor who success-
fully challenges an exemption claim under the Bankruptcy Code re-
sulting from a fraudulent asset conversion will take one of two forms:
(1) subjecting the exempt property in question to the creditors'
claims, 124 or (2) bringing the nonexempt property back into the
debtor's estate. 125 A more interesting question is whether and to what
extent creditors have an election between these remedies. This ques-
tion can arise where the value of the exempt and nonexempt property
vary significantly after the asset conversion, encouraging creditors to
try to reach the more valuable of the two. The trustee in In re Schw-
ingle 126 tried this approach when the debtor converted a nonexempt
promissory note payable to her into an exempt homestead. Believing
the exempt homestead to be more valuable, the trustee argued that the
appropriate remedy was to deny the exemption claim, thus making
the homestead available to creditors rather than bring the promissory
note back into the estate. The trustee made this argument under sec-
tion 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act which provided that the bankruptcy
court could preserve the transfer for the benefit of the estate. Balanc-
ing the conflicting interest between the debtor and the creditor, the
bankruptcy court refused to take such action. The Bankruptcy Code
removed this provision. However, this argument may still be avail-
able to a creditor under Arkansas law. Section 4-59-207(a)(3) of the
Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act states that a court may "[s]ubject
In re Porter, 37 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (real property transferred from debtor to
debtor and wife as joint tenants); In re White, 28 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (real
property transferred by debtor to debtor and wife as joint tenants).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) exempts "any interest in property in
which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an interest as a
tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety
or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law."
123. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-209(a), (b) (Supp. 1987).
124. See, e.g., Hinton v. Willard, 215 Ark. 204, 220 S.W.2d 423 (1949) (subjecting fraudu-
lently conveyed nonexempt assets to lien in favor of creditor); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-
207(a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
125. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-207(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).
126. 15 Bankr. 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
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to applicable principles of equity" grant the creditor "[a]ny other re-
lief the circumstances may require."' 2 7 This provision seems to open
the door to the same equitable arguments proposed by the trustee in
Schwingle as an alternate equitable remedy.
C. Denial of Discharge
Denial of discharge is a third way to prevent debtors from abus-
ing their right to convert nonexempt property to exempt property on
the eve of bankruptcy. To the extent Arkansas bankruptcy courts dis-
allow a fraud exception to exemption claims, it may be the only way
for creditors to challenge an asset conversion. Such a sanction is dis-
astrous to the debtor, since it nullifies the primary bankruptcy pur-
pose of relieving the debtor from his indebtedness and providing him
with a fresh start. Cases in this area have generally focused on two
exceptions to discharge under sections 727(a)(2) (fraudulent convey-
ance) and 727(a)(4) (fraudulent oaths or claims) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Bankruptcy Rule 4004 provides that in a Chapter 7 case a credi-
tor or trustee objecting to discharge must file a complaint "not later
than 60 days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors
held pursuant to Section 341(a)."'' 28 An objection to discharge is an
adversary proceeding governed by Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules.
Unless an extension of time has been granted, an objection to dis-
charge untimely filed is fatally flawed. 12 9 As with a challenge to an
exemption claim, the burden of proving the objection is on the party
making the objection. 3° This changes prior bankruptcy law which
shifted the burden of proof to the debtor after the objecting party
made out a prima facie case.' 3' The burden of going forward, how-
ever, may be shifted to the debtor once the objecting party shows facts
demonstrating that the debtor has taken any of the actions prohibited
by section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 132 A preponderance of the
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4 -59-207(a)(3) (Supp. 1987). Nothing in § 207(a) suggests that
the remedies are in the alternative.
128. BANKR. R. 4004(a). For a Chapter I case a complaint must be filed not later than on
the first date set for a hearing on confirmation.
129. See Edwards v. Whitfield, 11 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 193 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1984).
130. BANKR. R. 4005.
131. In re Decker, 595 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1979); BANKR. R. 407.
132. In re Hyder, 38 Bankr. 467 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Klayminc, 37 Bankr. 728
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Waddle, 29 Bankr. 100 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Savel, 29
Bankr. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
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evidence is the degree of proof required.' 33
The 1987 case of In re Swift 134 presented claims under these two
areas to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma. The bank creditor alleged that (1) a $17,906 preban-
kruptcy payment on a promissory note secured by a second mortgage
on the debtors' homestead was a fraudulent transfer sufficient for the
court to deny discharge under section 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code and (2) a $750 transfer to a son's trust made five months before
bankruptcy and not disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules was cause
for the court to deny discharge under section 727(a)(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Notwithstanding these allegations the Bankruptcy
Court denied the creditor's objection to discharge. Since the facts of
Swift are not particularly unusual in asset conversion cases, the opera-
tion of these two provisions should be examined in detail.
1. Transfers with Intent to Hinder, Delay, or Defraud Under
Section 72 7(a) (2)
Unlike cases dealing with denial of exemption claims, a debtor's
entitlement to a discharge is determined by federal law.'35 Since sec-
tion 727(a)(2) is derived directly from section 14(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act, there is ample interpretive federal case law. This case law sug-
gests that the scope of section 727(a)(2) is narrower than challenges to
exemption claims. First, by its own terms, section 727(a)(2) only ap-
plies to prohibited transactions within one year before the date of fil-
ing the petition. An objection to exemption under state law may be
based on significantly older transactions. Second, there must be ac-
tual fraudulent intent, as distinguished from constructive intent (or
constructive fraud), which may be invoked under section 548(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code or equivalent provisions of state law. Third,
some courts have noted that "[a] higher degree of fraud is required to
deny a discharge than to deny a claimed exemption."' 36 Finally, as
previously discussed, the burden of proof (persuasion) always remains
on the objecting party.
Like Arkansas law, actual fraudulent intent under section
133. In re Wright, 247 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mo. 1965); In re Swift, 72 Bankr. 563 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1987). Cf In re Hennebry, 207 F. 882 (N.D. Iowa 1913).
134. 72 Bankr. 563 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987).
135. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983).
136. In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999, 1006 n.l (2d Cir. 1976); In re Ostrer, 393 F.2d 646 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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727(a)(2) may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.' 37 Once
again, however, the per se conversion rule requires the demonstration
of facts other than the mere conversion to find fraud. In proving ac-
tual fraud, federal law, like state law, also recognizes certain tradi-
tional badges of fraud such as (1) retention of use of transferred
property, 38 (2) transfers to family members 139 and (3) lack of consid-
eration for the transfer. 14°
2. False Oaths and Claims
Many times a creditor attacking discharge under section
727(a)(2) also asserts that discharge should be denied because of a
false oath under section 727(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Applica-
tion of this section is demonstrated in In re Collins 14 and In re El-
lingson.'42  Both involved prebankruptcy asset conversions which
were not initially disclosed in the bankruptcy schedules, even though
the debtors declared "under penalty of perjury" that they had read
the Schedules and that the Schedules or Statement of Financial Af-
fairs (as applicable) were "true and correct" to the "best of" the debt-
ors' "knowledge, information and belief."'' 4 3 In both cases, failure to
adequately disclose the asset conversion transactions resulted in a
creditor assertion that the debtors' made a "false oath or account"
within the meaning of section 727(a)(4).
Generally, a court may deny a debtor a discharge under section
727(a)(4) only for a false oath or account made in connection with a
bankruptcy proceeding.'" Additionally, a false statement not made
under oath should not deprive the debtor of discharge. 45 False oaths
can arise in any of several circumstances. First, both the bankruptcy
schedules and the Statement of Financial Affairs 146 require the debtor
137. In re Glaser, 49 Bankr. 1015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Future Time, Inc. v. Yates, 26
Bankr. 1006 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983); In re Frank, 14 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
138. In re Cadarette, 601 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. In re Butler, 38 Bankr. 884 (Bankr. D.C. Kan. 1984); In re Nazarian, 18 Bankr. 143
(Bankr. D.C. Md. 1982).
140. In re Peery, 40 Bankr. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re McDonald, 16 Bankr. 621
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
141. 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
142. 63 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
143. Official Bankruptcy Forms 6 & 8.
144. In re Lopez, 39 Bankr. 433 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1984) (denial of discharge under
§ 727(a)(4) is not warranted where activities complained of occurred prior to bankruptcy); In
re Ellison, 34 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (false affidavits given to lenders prior to
bankruptcy are not grounds to deny discharge under § 727(a)(4)).
145. In re Gorman, 14 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. N.D. Al. 1981).
146. See Official Bankruptcy Forms 7 & 8.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
to make certain disclosures which should reveal asset conversions.
Second, the false statement could occur during trial, or, more likely,
at the first section 341(a) meeting of creditors.
In these cases, the burden of proof (persuasion) is again on the
creditor to show that the debtor violated section 727(a)(4). 4 7 The
term "knowingly and fraudulently" requires that there be "an inten-
tional untruth in a matter material to the bankruptcy."' 4 This defini-
tion means that a court will not deny a discharge if the false statement
or omission is a mistake149 or is immaterial. 5 ° From the creditor's
standpoint it is not necessary to show a bad motive' 5' or prejudice to
the creditor. 5 2  On the other hand, errors and omissions which
amount to a reckless indifference to the truth, may be sufficient to
show that the debtor made the false statement "knowingly and fraud-
ulently." '53 Based on these section 727(a)(4) general rules, debtors
and their counsel should note two caveats often invoked in section
727(a)(4) litigation, one by debtors and the second by creditors.
The first usually helps debtors. Generally, a debtor who acts in
reliance on the advice of his attorney in completing the schedules
lacks the required intent to meet the requirements of section
727(a)(4).1 54 Since attorneys are many times involved in the process
of preparing bankruptcy filings this exception recognizes and takes
into account the information transfer problems which can confront
the debtor and his counsel. The debtors in both Collins and Ellingson
raised this exception to protect them.
147. In re Adlman, 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976).
148. In re Bergman, 6 F. Supp. 898, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); In re Ellingson, 63 Bankr. 271,
276 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (citing In re Melnick, 360 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1966)); In re
Gonday, 27 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1983).
149. Feldenstein v. Radio Distrib. Co., 323 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1963); In re MacDonald, 50
Bankr. 255 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Martinez, 22 Bankr. 419 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982); In
re Gonday, 27 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1983); In re Mully, 16 Bankr. 741 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 1982).
150. In re Bailey, 53 Bankr. 732 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (materiality is based on the perti-
nence of the information on the discovery of assets or past transactions); In re Yackley, 37
Bankr. 253 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (omission of worthless asset); In re Waddle, 29 Bankr.
100 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (omission of property without value).
151. In re Marshall, 47 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1931).
152. In re Cline, 48 Bankr. 581 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Mazzola, 4 Bankr. 593
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Imperial Millword Inc. v. Steinberg, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) (P)
67,494 (Bankr. Mass. 1980).
153. In re Cycle Accounting Services, 43 Bankr. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Di-
odati, 9 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re Mazzola, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 242
(Bankr. Mass. 1980).
154. In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Topper, 229 F.2d 691 (3d Cir.
1956); In re Norman, 41 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1984).
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In both cases attorneys helped the debtors fill out the schedules.
The trustee in Collins discovered a prebankruptcy satisfaction of
mortgage from an inspection of public real estate records prior to the
section 341(a) hearing. At that hearing the debtor freely admitted the
pay-off, and the schedules were subsequently amended to cure the de-
fect.' 55 In Ellingson questions asked at the section 341 hearing made
it clear to the debtor's attorney that the schedules contained incorrect
information. As a result, but subsequent to the hearing, the debtors'
attorney called the trustee to advise him of the errors and to explain
what in fact happened. In addition, the debtor's attorney also
amended the schedules to fully disclose the conversions.1 56 There are
only two distinctions between these two cases. First, the Collins
trustee was able to independently discover the asset conversion from
public records, while this option was unavailable to the Ellingson
trustee since the transaction in question did not result in any public
filing. Second, the debtor and his attorney in Ellingson testified that
the debtor "was extremely concerned about ... apparent discrepan-
cies in the bankruptcy schedules" and called his attorney frequently
"to inquire about the schedules and to make certain they were cor-
rect."' 57 Based on these facts, the Collins debtor was unsuccessful
because of the caveat to the attorney advice rule: The debtor's reli-
ance must be reasonable. 5 ' The court in Collins found that the only
reason for the omission, that is the failure to disclose the conversion
transaction, was "to prevent the trustee from protecting the estate.
To list is to alert, to omit is to buy quiescence, i.e., don't wake up a
sleeping dog. The Court simply does not believe the debtor when he
suggests that the omission was innocent."' 59 Ellingson distinguishes
Collins as follows:
Collins holds that the reliance upon the attorney was not a good
faith reliance under the facts of that case. In Collins, the trustee
had to ferret out the existence of a transfer from official public
records and confront the debtor with that information before the
debtor would admit that the schedules were in error.'6o
The debtors' due diligence in making frequent inquiries and the attor-
ney's due diligence in making a disclosure and amendments following
155. 19 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
156. 63 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
157. Id. at 276.
158. In re Bateman, 646 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Ailetcher, 49 Bankr. 681
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1985).
159. 19 Bankr. 874, 878 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
160. 63 Bankr. 271, 277 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
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the section 341 hearing combined to avoid the adverse impact of sec-
tion 727(a)(4) in Ellingson.
The second caveat favors creditors. Generally, amendments
made after the false oath will not cure the problem. Absent reason-
able reliance on counsel, mistake or immateriality, a false statement
once made cannot be cured by amendment."' The egg once broken,
cannot be put back together.
IV. ASSET CONVERSIONS AND THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
As demonstrated by the cases already discussed in this article, a
debtor's asset conversion many times begins with his attorney.162 Af-
ter determining that a debtor has serious creditor problems, the typi-
cal conversation may proceed along these lines:
Debtor's Question: "If someone takes a judgment against me
or if I go into bankruptcy, what property can I keep?"
Attorney's Answer: "In Arkansas, property such as the house
in which you live, in other words your homestead, and certain
other classes of personal property are exempt from the claims of
your creditors."
Debtor's Question: "You know my financial condition, how
can I protect as many of my assets as possible from my creditors?"
This dialog raises potentially difficult ethical problems for attorneys,
as is amply demonstrated by the 1981 Wisconsin case of In re
Schwingle.163
In May, 1977, Mrs. Schwingle, a seventy-nine year old widow,
was faced with a $112,000 personal judgment against her. At that
time, she lived on a farm which she had sold to her two sons in 1974,
reserving a life estate for herself in a house located on the farm. The
sons paid for the farm by giving her their promissory note for
$31,730.78 secured by a mortgage on the farm. After the court en-
tered judgment, Mrs. Schwingle was clearly insolvent with no way to
161. Mazer v. United States, 298 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1962); In re Schnabel, 61 F. Supp. 386
(D. Minn. 1945); Ex Parte Certo, 8 F. Supp. 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1934); In re Cline, 48 Bankr. 581
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re George,
9 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Mazzola, 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 242 (Bankr.
Mass. 1980).
162. For an excellent discussion of the ethical considerations in bankruptcy estate planning
see Bisignano, Protecting Assets From Overzealous Creditors or An Estate Planner's Guide to
Preservation Planning, Financial and Estate Planning (CCH) 25,951, at 24,021-24-052 (Dec.
1987).
163. 15 Bankr. 291 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
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pay the judgment creditor. She immediately contacted her attorney
"because of her concern that the (judgment creditor) would levy on
her assets."' 4 As a result of that conference, the attorney wrote Mrs.
Schwingle a letter proposing two possible alternatives: (1) her sons
could pay off their 1974 note to her and she could use the proceeds to
purchase a homestead; or (2) her sons could resell the home to her in
satisfaction of her 1974 note and mortgage. 6 ' Either action would
result in the conversion of a nonexempt asset (the note and mortgage)
into an exempt asset (the homestead). Subsequently, the attorney de-
livered a second letter confirming his prior written recommendations
but containing the following warning:
I've also previously advised you that taking that action (the con-
version of nonexempt property to exempt property) will most
likely cause you to be involved in a legal action by the (judgment
creditor) in an effort to upset your repurchase of the homestead.
It is my opinion.., that such an action on your part is perfectly
proper. Obviously, only the judge will tell us if in fact it was
proper . ... 166
Based on the attorney's advice, the sons reconveyed to Mrs. Schwin-
gle a portion of the farm, including her homestead, in consideration
for a $25,000 reduction in their debt to her. At the same time, Mrs.
Schwingle executed a will leaving that reconveyed portion of the farm
to her sons. Less than two months later, Mrs. Schwingle declared
bankruptcy.
On these facts the trial court found the asset conversion was
made with actual intent to defraud creditors within the meaning of
section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act. 16  Thus, the court's decision
justified the attorney's warning. Many of the cases already discussed
or cited in this article involve facts similar to those of In re Schwingle
and present the same practitioner problems.' 68 For Arkansas practi-
164. Id. at 292.
165. Id. at 292-93. This advice was confirmed in a letter dated June 8, 1977 from the
attorney to Mrs. Schwingle, in which he states:
As you know the plaintiff will be asking for and will receive judgment against you on
the basis of the verdict on June 13, 1977. I have advised you that prior to that date
we will take the nonexempt asset you have (the mortgage note and mortgage) and use
that as consideration for you to purchase an exempt asset (your house made a
homestead).
Id. at 293.
166. Id. at 295. This case was brought by the trustee and judgment first rendered by the
bankruptcy court prior to October 1, 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, and was
therefore decided under prior law.
167. Id. at 292.
168. In re Saunders, 37 Bankr. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Hall, 31 Bankr. 42
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tioners, these problems must be solved by reference to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) as adopted by
Arkansas. 16
9
A fundamental principle of a lawyer's professional responsibility
is that everyone should have access to the services of a competent
attorney. 70 On the other hand Model Rule 1.2(d) states that "a law-
yer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ... ."7 As previ-
ously discussed, this issue may arise because Arkansas law may make
some asset conversions fraudulent as to creditors. In the hypothetical
debtor/attorney conversation discussed previously, does an attorney
who tells a debtor "how" to protect his assets violate the Model
Rules? 172
To answer this inquiry it is necessary to first recognize that the
"how to" question involves a two-part analysis which is common to
most client questions. The first part is "tell me (the client) what the
law is," while the second part is "advise me (the client) how to take
advantage of that law given my factual circumstances." How far can
attorneys go in answering? Case law and Bar Association advisory
opinions from sister states supply some guidance.
In 1984 the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee is-
sued an opinion which addressed a related issue under the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Can an attorney participate in a transfer of a client's property from
the client's name to his spouse's name in anticipation of the possi-
bility of the judgment being entered against the client where the
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Wallace, 30 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1983); Mickelson v.
Anderson, 31 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982); In re Collins, 19 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1982).
169. Effective January 1, 1986, the Code of Professional Responsibility was superseded in
Arkansas by a version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Ameri-
can Bar Association. All references in this article to the "Model Rules" shall refer to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In the
matter of the Arkansas Bar Association: Petition for the Adoption of Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 287 Ark. 495, 702 S.W.2d 326 (1985).
170. See ARK. MOD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent represen-
tation to a client").
171. ARK. MOD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(d). See also ARK. MOD. R. PROF. CONDUCT
8.4(a) (professional misconduct to violate the Model Rules), 8.4(c) (professional misconduct to
be involved in fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) and 8.4(d) (professional misconduct to be
involved in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice).
172. See In re Alschuler, 388 Ill. 492, 58 N.E.2d 563 (1945) (disciplinary action for any-
thing calculated to deceive); Hicks v. State, 422 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
("Fraudulent conduct" means "an act, omission, or concealment done, made or affected as an
attorney with a purpose, design or intent to carry out fraud or wrong").
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sole purpose of the transfer would be to avoid the possibility that a
creditor would recover a deficiency judgment against the property
conveyed?17 3
The Committee concluded that such conduct was permissible so long
as there is no "immediate" reasonable prospect of a judgment being
entered against the client. A transfer merely to avoid the future possi-
bility of a creditor suit is not a violation of the disciplinary rules.7 4
This opinion seems to support the role of the attorney in creating a
plan to avoid "potential" creditor problems. But what happens if the
contemplated transfer is more "immediate?" This author has not
found any Arkansas case law directly on point. However, other states
have considered the question.
In Townsend v. State Bar of California 175 the court suspended an
attorney from practice because he advised his client to transfer prop-
erty for the purpose of defrauding a judgment creditor. The client
made the transfer two days before the judgment was taken. Based
upon a somewhat analogous fact situation, a Massachusetts attorney
was suspended for four months for helping a client conceal assets
from a potential creditor by the creation and foreclosure of false mort-
gages.' 76 In a similar vein the Texas Bar Committee on the Interpre-
tation of the Canons issued an opinion which states that an attorney
may not participate in a fraudulent conveyance of a homestead to a
third party. "7 These cases clearly indicate that attorneys are not pro-
tected by their status as advisors and advocates and can step over the
line of propriety in asset conversion cases.
Although not directly on point, the Model Rules provide gui-
dance for practitioners. Model Rule 1.3 requires that a "lawyer...
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client"
while Model Rule 1.1 mandates "competent representation." 1 7 8 Clar-
ifying these obligations, Model Rule 1.2 provides:
173. South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 84-02 issued May 25, 1984.
174. See Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(7) (replaced 1986)
and ARK. MOD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(d) and the Code Comparison.
175. 32 Cal. 2d 592, 197 P.2d 326 (1948).
176. In re Mandell, Case No. 84-42 B.D. (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. April 19, 1985) reported at
p. 808-09 of ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct Current Reports.
177. Opinion of the State Bar of Texas Committee on Interpretation of the Canons Ethics
Op. No. V-39 (May 1951) (the third party would reconvey retaining an artificial vendor's lien
or execute a mortgage and reconvey back to the owner who assumes the mortgage) (text of
opinion is contained in 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 212-13 (1966)).
178. ARK. MOD. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.1 states that "competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation."
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(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs .... (d) ....
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are
to be pursued...
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,
but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.179
Model Rule 1.4 goes even further by requiring a lawyer "to explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation."1 80 Thus, it appears
clear that an attorney whose client asks the "how to" question with
respect to asset conversions must first advise the debtor as to how
Arkansas law might treat asset conversions. This information in-
cludes at least the following: (1) the existence and scope of Arkansas'
exemptions; (2) the per se rule; (3) Arkansas' law providing that
transfers made with actual or constructive intent to defraud are fraud-
ulent as to creditors; (4) if applicable, the possible avoidance affects of
sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code; and (5) the risks, to the
debtor of loss of exemption, reversal of transfer and/or loss of dis-
charge in bankruptcy if a court subsequently finds that the exemption
conversion was fraudulent.
The attorney's letters in Schwingle generally discussed these is-
sues, but the first letter went further and actually suggested alterna-
tive methods using specific assets of the debtor with recommendations
as to how to implement the asset conversion. In hindsight and based
on the court's ruling, however, the attorney advised and helped imple-
ment a plan which was found to constitute fraud on Mrs. Schwingle's
creditors. This result raises the more difficult question as to what ex-
tent an attorney should be involved in implementing an asset conver-
sion once he has advised a client as to the legal boundaries.
The Comments to Model Rule 1.2 suggests that there are limits
to the lawyer's role.
When the client's course of action has already begun and is contin-
uing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer
is not permitted to reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where
permitted by Rule 1.6. However, the lawyer is required to avoid
179. Id. 1.2 (emphasis added).
180. See also Id. 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions).
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furthering the purpose, for example, by suggesting how it might be
concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct
that the lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but then discov-
ers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal from the representation,
therefore, may be required . . . Paragraph (d) applies whether or
not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a
lawyer should not participate in a sham transaction; for example, a
transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent escape of tax
liability. 181
The key to complying with Model Rule 1.2 is whether the lawyer
knows the conduct is fraudulent. The Model Rule states that
" 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question" '1 2 while
the term "'fraudulent' denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive
and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise an-
other of relevant information."18 3 Thus, the lawyer's role is based on
his knowledge of the client's purpose or intent behind an asset conver-
sion transaction. 4 As indicated in the section of this article dealing
with the role of motive in finding actual fraud, it is the rare debtor
who does not have two or more motives for an asset conversion. If a
debtor has two motives, the attorney may resolve reasonable doubts in
favor of his client. Such a resolution, however, may depend in part on
skillful questioning of the debtor by the attorney to establish multiple
motives. This must obviously be done in good faith for the attorney
to determine that his doubt is reasonable. Nor should the attorney
assist in creating the motive. Additionally, reliance on a "desire to
own the exempt property" as one of the motives should concern the
attorney because recent case law suggests that reason is inadequate
181. Id. 1.2 comment (emphasis added).
182. Id. terminology. The definition goes on to state that "[a] person's knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances."
183. Id.
184. Id. 1.2 code comparison generally cross references to DR 7-101(A) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Although not specifically referenced in the Code Comparison to
the Model Rules ethical consideration 7-6 supports this conclusion:
Whether the proposed action of a lawyer is within the bounds of the law may be a
perplexing question when his client is contemplating a course of conduct having legal
consequences that vary according to the client's intent, motive, or desires at the time
of the action. Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence
relevant to the state of mind of the client at a particular time. He may properly assist
his client in the development and preservation of evidence of existing motive, intent,
or desire; obviously, he may not do anything furthering the creation or preservation
of false evidence. In many cases a lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of
his client, and in those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his
client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-6.
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without more."8 5
This conclusion is also consistent with a "good faith" exception
which some jurisdictions have adopted. For example, in State v.
Baker,'86 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that an honest, good
faith belief that services are well founded and in the best interest of a
client is a defense to a malpractice or disbarment action.
Finally, this discussion does not purport to consider all of the
ethical questions which can be raised by an exemption conversion.
For example, attorneys should consider the impact of Model Rules
3.7 and 1.16(a)(1) which require withdrawal as counsel under some
circumstances when a lawyer becomes a witness, 187 Model Rules
1.2(a) and 1.6 concerning preservation of confidences and secrets of a
client "'88 and Model Rule 1.7(b) involving conflicts of interest in repre-
senting multiple clients (such as a husband and wife). 189 At a mini-
mum, however, lawyers must not only advise debtors about
potentially serious adverse affects to the debtors of asset conversions,
but must also understand the ethical questions raised in such
situations.
V. ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST ATTORNEYS
The previous discussion focuses on ethical problems presented by
asset conversions. But, lawyers who counsel or engage in fraudulent
conduct may also have civil liabilities to creditors. For example, in
185. See supra note 18 for cases disallowing asset conversions. In In re Martin, 217 F.
Supp. 937 (D. Oregon 1963) the debtor conferred with his attorney one day before bankruptcy
about how to conserve $400 cash which he had just received from the sale of some real prop-
erty. The debtor testified that the attorney "told me I was allowed the rifle and pistol and a
whole bunch of exempt articles." Id. Based on this advice the debtor decided the $400 "was
to go... hundred and seventy-five for the bankruptcy, which was .... I had to do, twenty-five
dollars legal fee for the sale of the house and two hundred dollars for the rifle." Id. Based on
this quite honest testimony, the bankruptcy referee found that the debtor's conversion was
"effected with a conscious effort to convert non-exempt assets into exempt assets with the
purpose of making them unavailable... in a contemplated bankruptcy proceedings ...." Id.
at 938.
186. 539 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). See also People ex rel. Chicago State Bar
Ass'n v. Lotterman, 353 Ill. 399, 187 N.E. 424 (1933) (acts done in good faith and without
conscious and willful perpetration of wrong do not require disbarment even though contrary to
professional ethics).
187. In other words whether answering the question of "how to" makes the lawyer a wit-
ness as to the intent of the debtor in making an exemption conversion.
188. For example, suppose the client gives subsequent information which causes the lawyer
to doubt the motive.
189. Consider the problems associated with irrevocable interspousal gifts and what hap-
pens in a divorce. See Wade, When Can a Lawyer Represent Both Husband and Wife in Estate
Planning, PROB. & PROP. March-April 1987, at 13.
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McElhanon v. Hing'9° an attorney was held liable for $286,120 in
damages for involvement in a scheme to defraud a judgment creditor.
The attorney participated in negotiating and drafting a stock transfer
transaction knowing that his client was or would be rendered insol-
vent by the transfer. Affirming the trial court, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that conduct which hindered, delayed or defrauded the
creditor was actionable.1 91 In an era of expanding lender liability the-
ories, debtor attorneys involved with asset conversions should them-
selves be wary of creditors searching for remedies and deep pockets.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The justifications for the per se conversion rule, the bankruptcy
policy of affording a debtor a fresh start, and the goals of exemption
laws are all consistent with permitting a debtor to acquire, improve or
otherwise convert nonexempt property into exempt property in con-
templation of bankruptcy. As seen from the cases discussed in this
article, the real difficulty faced by the courts in asset conversion cases
is balancing these justifications and goals against the right of creditors
to be treated fairly in the distribution of the debtor's estate. As a
result of this concern, courts have resorted to judicial techniques to
avoid results which are unfair to creditors. These techniques include
(1) interpreting the facts to find that the resulting exemption claim
actually does not fit the statutory exemption, (2) disallowing the ex-
emption because of constructive or actual fraud, and (3) denying dis-
charge for actual fraud. Applying these techniques, courts have
arrived at widely varying results, even in similar fact situations. The
variety of state laws is one reason. But when these various situations
are examined, it appears that the courts usually have one common
concern. Although some courts have denied that the value of the re-
sulting exempt property is determinative, others have more openly
stated that judicial approval of the conversion of nonexempt property
to exempt property without regard to the value of that property is
unfair to creditors. The resulting case law has been confusing, be-
cause no valuation standard is provided in most state exemptions.
As a result Arkansas lawyers are severely handicapped in prop-
erly advising their clients for at least three reasons: (1) lack of uni-
formity in court decisions which purport to apply similar principles
but reach differing results; (2) the open question of whether and to
190. 151 Ariz. 386, 728 P.2d 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
151 Ariz. 403, 728 P.2d 273 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1956 (1987).
191. 151 Ariz. at 407, 728 P.2d at 277 (1986).
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what extent a creditor can attack an Arkansas exemption claim for
fraud; and (3) the disastrous consequences to the debtor if a court, on
hindsight, determines that the asset conversion worked as a fraud on
creditors. In these situations, attorneys are forced to walk a tightrope
between their ethical obligations to the court and their client. To as-
sist practitioners in dealing with these issues, the Arkansas legislature
should consider two alternative statutory remedies:
First: Arkansas should consider adopting a statutory presump-
tion that asset conversions within a certain time period of bankruptcy
are presumed to be made in contemplation of bankruptcy and are
either (1) avoidable or (2) subject to creditor claims, unless the debtor
can prove that the asset conversion was made for reasons other than
contemplation of bankruptcy. Illinois has adopted such an exception
which provides: "Property acquired within six months of the filing of
the petition for bankruptcy shall be presumed to have been acquired
in contemplation of bankruptcy."'19 2 Rather than use the term "ac-
quired" it might be less ambiguous to reword the statute to cover all
asset conversion mechanisms.
For example:
The acquisition, improvement or other conversion of nonexempt
property to exempt property within six months of the filing of a
petition for bankruptcy shall be presumed to have been acquired,
improved or otherwise converted in contemplation of bankruptcy.
Such a statutory approach places the burden on a debtor to justify his
actions in terms of the goals and purposes of both exemption statutes
and the Bankruptcy Code.
Second: To avoid the current uncertainties in the law, Arkansas'
exemption statutes (to the extent permitted by the constitution)
should expressly be made subject to actual and constructive fraud ex-
ceptions. This action will (1) make sure that debtors and creditors
know the rules and (2) provide a mechanism for creditors to attack
asset conversions other than by objecting to discharge.
Acting on these two proposals will clarify Arkansas' position on
pre-bankruptcy asset conversions and allow courts to balance the
needs of debtors with the rights of creditors in a manner consistent
with the twin purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.
192. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110 § 12-1001(h)(4) (1984).
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